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Highlights 
 
* Platform urbanism increasingly defines the ways in which cities develop for the future 
* Platform urbanism is one of the latest developments of the smart city 
* Chinese platform urbanism challenges currently held notions of urban citizenship and urban 
lifestyles 
* China’s urban platforms show domestic as well as international patterns of mobility 
 
Abstract 
In this article, we argue for an extension of current debates on smart urbanism in China by 
focusing on the emergence of urban platforms as a key way in which Chinese cities are 
developing into digitally-enhanced and governed urban areas. China has undergone multiple 
rounds of thematic urban development, culminating in a recent policy focus on the smart city 
and on digitally-enhanced urbanism. We argue that this has now evolved, and outline the 
rapidly emerging phenomenon of platform urbanism, which we conceptualise as not only 
confined to the policy sphere, but as stretching across the policy-governance-corporate 
nexus, the market, and urban consumption practices and broader culture. We do so by 
focusing on key themes emerging in contemporary platform-based digital urban development 
in China: a.) the rapidly developing geography of urban platforms; b.) a swiftly expanding mass 
of data and its implications for state-private sector power geometries; c.) domestic urban 
policy and practice mobilities, and consequences for the circulation of digital urban platforms 
between cities and across national boundaries; d.) implications for a reconfiguration of urban 
citizenship; e.) new configurations of urban materialities in the digital platform era. We 
conclude with brief reflections on data-led urbanism in contemporary China. 
 
 
Introduction 
China’s urban development has undergone several phases since the 1980s. A number of key 
themes have emerged at different times during this period of hyper-urbanisation (He and 
Qian 2017). From the focus on development zones from the 1990s onwards (Yeh and Wu 
1996), to the realisation of world city visions (Wu 2000) and spectacular architecture (Ren 
2011), to the promotion of low-carbon and eco-city blueprints and projects in the mid- to 
late-2000s onwards (Wu 2012), China’s cities have been the stage of various rounds of (often 
contemporaneous) future-focused development trends. From the early 2010s onwards, 
smart cities have rapidly emerged as a key lens through which to think about China’s urban 
future (Cowley et al 2018). Smart urbanism is difficult to define, but can be broadly described 
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as a focus on data-centred urban development and on digital technologies and infrastructures 
that enable more efficient and integrated urban management, governance and economic 
activity (Kitchin 2014).  
 
In this article, we argue for an extension of current debates on smart urbanism in China by 
focusing on the emergence of platform urbanism. Urban platforms are a key way in which 
Chinese cities are developing into digitally-enhanced and governed urban areas. We define 
urban platforms as digital software and hardware-based interfaces that: enable multiple 
users to interact and multiple (financial and other) transactions to be carried out in real time 
or near-real time; are centrally focused on leveraging the ability to analyse, manipulate and 
(sometimes) monetise large flows of digital data; have an effect, or multiple effects, on the 
way urban life, broadly understood, is conducted. While the smart city, as defined above, is 
generally focused on a range of data-centred technologies, platform urbanism can be 
described as an extension of smart urbanism that focuses on digital platforms, in various 
iterations and typologies, as the key interfaces between growing amounts of urban economic, 
social, cultural and political data and approaches to processing, managing, operationalising, 
commodifying and controlling this data. 
 
In the following, we highlight key themes emerging in contemporary platform-based digital 
urban development in China: a.) the rapidly developing geography of urban platforms; b.) a 
rapidly expanding ‘data bomb’ and its implications for state-private sector power geometries; 
c.) domestic urban policy and practice mobilities; d.) implications for a reconfiguration of 
urban citizenship; e.) new configurations of urban materialities in the digital platform era. We 
conclude with brief reflections on data-led urbanism in contemporary China. 
 
An emerging geography of platforms in urban China  
China’s rapid urban development in the past few decades has been increasingly paralleled by 
the swift rise of digital industries. Corporations such as Google, Amazon and Ebay have 
emerged as private sector near-hegemons on the global stage. At the same time, the Chinese 
domestic market has seen a parallel, more rapid development in the rise of very large, 
domestic technology firms, such as Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei and others. Just as China 
has grown to be known as the leading BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) economy, so its 
leading digital technology corporations have come to be known as the BATs (Baidu, Alibaba 
and Tencent) (He 2017). More broadly, China’s digital economy has grown in size, scope, and 
impact. The number of unicorn corporations (defined as privately-held start-ups valued at 
over US$1bn) in the country in 2017 was 34, compared with 47 in the US and 19 in the rest of 
the world. Concurrently, the value of e-commerce transactions in China is now worth more 
than the sum of e-commerce transactions in the US, Germany, France, Japan and the United 
Kingdom combined (Woetzel et al 2017).  
 
The rapid development of a domestic digital industry with international reach has connected 
with urban development through the generation of large volumes of data, as well as 
communication, governance and sensing capabilities: from sensor networks, to smart city 
management dashboards, to facial recognition systems. National priorities around smart city 
development (championed by the central government throughout the 2010s and especially 
from the 12th (2011-15) Five Year Plan onwards) have been bolstered by this technological 
and economic development. As early as 2014, ‘all the cities at provincial or above level, 89% 
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prefecture-level cities, and about 40% county-level cities’ had smart city strategies in place 
(He et al 2018: 668). At the same time, a key development has been the rise in platform-based 
access to data-enabled urban economic and governance services. A key way of illustrating 
this is through the rapid emergence and adoption of smartphones: in 2008 there were 17 
million smartphones in use in the country, rising to 1.09 billion by 2018 (Yang and Xu 2018). 
Although smartphones are simply one window into the platform economy, their 
multiplication is testament to the increasing importance of digital platforms for 
understanding the ways in which the economy, governance, and cultures of consumption and 
urban experience are evolving. 
 
The confluence of a highly developed digital economy, smart city-focused policies, the 
generation of digital data, and the adoption of platforms as ways to access, use, and consume 
data and services (Lee and Hwang 2018) has meant that platforms are now a key way of 
experiencing, regulating, governing and measuring the Chinese city. Many readily identifiable 
Chinese digital urban platforms are consumer-focused, from the Didi Chuxing ride-hailing 
service, to Alipay’s mobile payment system. Nonetheless, there also exists a range of complex 
urban governance-focused platforms. Projects such as Hangzhou CityBrain, developed by 
Alibaba and based on a cloud computing architecture, are a case in point. CityBrain is an urban 
governance-focused platform that utilizes real-time sensed data to both optimize car journey 
times across Hangzhou city and provide automatic monitoring of traffic and other violations 
and infringements. The system processes data streamed from multiple sensor systems 
including more than 2,000 cameras (mounted on traffic lights and other elements of urban 
infrastructure), as well as vehicle trajectory information (Min et al 2018).  
 
What is particularly interesting about projects such as Hangzhou CityBrain is the interplay 
between local governments (who request, co-design and pay for digital solutions), and 
technology corporations (who co-design and deploy platform systems) in terms of balances 
of power and agency. This interplay between policy, corporate and other actors in an 
entrepreneurial system of innovation and technology development is an example of the 
development of what has been termed a social technology (Andreani et al 2019). It also points 
to the need to investigate multiple stakeholders and drivers in any investigation of platform 
urbanism (Brem and Radziwon 2017). These more general aspects, however, as well as 
CityBrain’s specific characteristics, are still centred on platform urbanism’s key component: 
data. Corporations enable the generation, analysis and manipulation of data through data 
analytics and Artificial Intelligence (AI), but different levels of government are active in 
attempting to retain power over data through regulatory means. This highlights the highly 
glocal nature of platform urbanism, rooted as it is in the interplay between global drivers and 
local contexts (Dameri et al 2019). Thus, China’s emergent platform urbanism exhibits 
characteristics that are not simply market-based, but that hinge on evolving relationships 
between different scales of government and the rising power of domestic digital technology 
corporations. 
 
The rise of Chinese digital platforms is to be noted for its rapidity as well as its societal and 
urban pervasiveness. In addition, urban platforms have clearly started to impact on the shape 
of smart cities in distinctly spatial ways, as will be seen below. There exists an emergent 
literature discussing platform urbanism and its undergirding of cities (van der Graf and Ballon 
2018): much of this has been focused on specific types of platforms such as urban data 
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platforms (Barns 2018). Understanding the typology of urban platforms emerging in Chinese 
cities is key to analyzing the effects that these platforms are having on the urban sphere. 
Although offering a comprehensive typology of contemporary Chinese urban platforms falls 
outside the scope of this article (and would in any case simply provide a snapshot in time of 
a fast-developing field of urban experience and materiality), it is nonetheless useful to sketch 
and illustrate some general contours. These can then be rendered more detailed through 
further in-depth, longitudinal empirical and theoretical research. Briefly, and based on an 
adaptation of Srnicek’s (2016) typology of platform capitalism, Chinese urban platforms can 
be categorized as falling within one or more of the following types: 
 
Advertising platforms, such as Tencent’s Wechat, or Soso, Baidu and Toutiao, focused on 
extracting data for the purposes of generating revenues from advertising. These were often 
the first-mover platform-focused corporations, not just in China but worldwide (where the 
likes of Google and Facebook were largely focused on advertising). 
 
Commercial/Retail platforms such as JD or Taobao, centered on providing an interface 
through which a range of commercial goods and commodities can be ordered and sourced. 
 
Sharing platforms, which are central to the sharing economy and based on the use of the 
platform to enable access to products, goods and services (such as car rides through Didi 
Chuxing, or Meituan for a range of services including food delivery) that are not directly 
owned by the platform operator. 
 
Governance platforms, such as Alibaba’s CityBrain system, aimed at enabling data-focused 
urban governance and steering in a range of urban sectors from transport, to emergency 
response management, and the like. 
 
Payment platforms, such as Alibaba’s Alipay, or Tencent’s WeChat Pay. These have become 
ubiquitous: both Alipay and WeChat Pay individually handled, in any single month in 2017, 
more payments than the annual total of UUS$451bn handled via US rival PayPal (Fraser 2018). 
 
The involvement of corporates, and of municipal governments, has contributed to the 
generation of specific geographies around platform urbanism in China. Chinese platforms are 
largely owned or invested in by domestic technology corporations. This includes the BATs, 
which have a combined market capitalization of nearly US $600bn, and an average rate of 
year-on-year profit growth of over 50% (Greeven and Wei 2017). In terms of geography, a 
case in point is that the three Chinese internet giants are headquartered in three leading cities: 
Beijing (Baidu), Hangzhou (Alibaba) and Shenzhen (Tencent). This geographical distribution 
matters, since each corporation has engaged with local government in the vicinity of its 
headquarters city. Alibaba’s CityBrain project in Hangzhou, for example, has also been rolled 
out to surrounding cities including Suzhou, Quzhou, and Shanghai. Tencent, meanwhile, has 
participated in digital city planning projects in Shenzhen and Guangzhou, and Baidu has 
carried out work along similar lines in metropolitan Beijing. While each corporation’s 
geographical focus, and the involvement of local government, has been mirrored across all 
three headquarters locations, at the same time a key area of differentiation has emerged in 
that each corporation has chosen to focus on different sectors of smart city and platform 
urbanism development. Tencent has largely focused on the digitalization and platformisation 
 6 
of existing industries (particularly healthcare, security, transportation and digital governance). 
Alibaba has invested more closely in the application of AI technologies to the city. Baidu has 
centred a large amount of effort on geomapping and automation, such as through the use of 
its Baidumap system as a navigation platform for autonomous vehicles. 
 
Platform urbanism and the ‘data bomb’ 
The advent of platform urbanism has meant that state-corporate relations are being 
recalibrated to some extent. This is because smart city projects and policies, and urban 
governance and digital economic activity mediated by platforms, sees data placed at the 
centre of state-corporate, and state-market relations. As digital products have improved and 
developed, the data analytics and calculative power of corporate actors such as the BATs (and 
many others) have increased, as the ‘digitalization, informationalization and gridding of all 
things’ (Wu et al 2018: 61) proceeds apace. On the one hand, this potentially makes them 
qualified and trustworthy (over foreign firms) partners for state-led projects. On the other 
hand, data has become a key asset that requires negotiation and control. 
 
The Chinese urban data landscape is increasingly complex. On the one hand, government-
held data is significant in volume, but presents its own challenges. Liu et al (2015) point out 
that urban data relevant to cities in China is first of all dispersed between different 
government agencies, and is partly available online and offline. Secondly, different agencies’ 
data may present overlaps which cannot be easily reconciled. Thirdly, government-held data 
is often heterogeneous, and exists in different formats related to a variety of geographies, or 
using varying longitudinal parameters. The volume of data can also be significant: in a single 
study covering just eight days of mobile phone-sourced data-gathering in Shanghai, a total of 
around 20 million different mobile phone identifications were recorded across 9,578 base 
stations used in the study (Shi and Yang 2017). This is a small window, using a single type of 
data, into the complex, high-volume and real-time nature of urban data gathering and 
potential analysis in contemporary urban China. Indeed, Liu et al (2015) highlight that the 
pace and scale of urbanization in the country is in itself a data challenge, as it requires 
synergies to be found between public and private actors, and for the ability to gather and 
analyse data in near real-time.  
 
Thus, the gradual digitalization of urban life in Chinese cities has led to what we call a ‘data 
bomb’ era, whereby increasing volumes of data necessitate handling and processing 
capabilities that are typically held by corporate actors. While the exponential growth in data 
and computing power has led to the development of technological innovations such as AI (See 
2017), it presents challenges at the same time. How to conceptualise this ‘data bomb’? It is 
helpful to illustrate the volume of data by noting, based on Li et al (2015), that every day, 
Baidu processes c.6bn search queries, and its data expands by 10 TB per day. A single high-
definition camera can produce up to 3.6 GB per hour: there are over 20 million such cameras 
in use in China today. Another example of large data volumes is Beijing’s traffic control centre, 
which sees its data increase by 30 GB per day, and China’s national grid generates c.510 TB of 
data per annum. Associated economies of data storage and processing are significant: the 
estimated cost for constructing a data storage facility for Tianjin’s municipal security system 
is USD c.$7.25bn (Ibid). The corporate sector is increasingly the site where data processing 
and analytics capabilities are to be found, and where continuous processing can be enabled 
(McColl 2017). This potentially recasts the state (at certain points of the smart urban project 
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development lifecycle at least) in a client role. The fact that this could lead to a deepening 
imbalance in power geometries over data is also underscored by the successful (state-led) 
development of the digital economy, which has meant that top digital talent is increasingly 
attracted by domestic technology corporations (Zhang 2016) rather than the state. 
 
Domestic urban policy and practice mobilities 
Chinese cities currently engage with data through a combination of municipal- or state-led 
activities to generate, analyse and use digital data, and engagement with private sector 
corporations (both large technology corporations and smaller firms). At the same time, new 
policies and mechanisms to facilitate governance through data are emerging. An example of 
this is the CityBrain system, highlighted above. The shared need, across multiple cities, to 
handle large volumes of data in a new urban data governance era has led to the circulation 
of governance policies, frameworks and platforms throughout urban China. The CityBrain 
system, for example, has been deployed outside Hangzhou and is now being utilized in a range 
of cities including Suzhou, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Chongqing and Macau. This is part and 
parcel of the making and circulation of state-corporate urban policy mobilities (McCann 2011) 
in a domestic context. We argue that, due to the central involvement of corporate actors in 
designing the technical blueprints of systems like CityBrain, the circulation of these digital 
urban governance systems throughout China is testament not only to domestic, digital urban 
policy mobilities, but to the existence of practice mobilities as well. 
 
Furthermore, it is clear that platform-enabled digital urban policy and practice mobilities are 
not simply confined to China. CityBrain, for example, was sold to Kuala Lumpur in 2018 as a 
way of enabling the Malaysian city to make its transport system more efficient. This signals 
the emergence of international urban policy and practice mobilities based on the rise of 
platform urbanism in China. This development raises key questions, for example around the 
extent to which non-domestic technology corporations gain access and exploitation 
opportunities with regards to urban data initially sourced for governance purposes. At the 
same time, the emerging international proliferation of international digital urban policy and 
practice mobilities also enables an alternative, less dualistic perspective on policy mobilities. 
This is denoted by the fact that while much of the urban policy mobilities literature has 
focused on North-South policy mobilities (Clarke 2012), examples such as CityBrain show 
different geographical trajectories, originating in the East. 
 
Reconfigurations of urban citizenship?  
A further question around emerging platform urbanism in China is its effect on urban 
citizenship. Firstly, does the increasing centrality of platform-enabled urban lifestyles, 
governance and consumption signify new directions in the ways in which citizenship is defined 
and experienced in the Chinese city, or does it simply herald a deepening of current 
citizenship trends? In part, digitally-enabled urbanism might seem to be simply enabling 
urban life for urban dwellers, while leaving current iterations and inequalities largely 
untouched (Joss et al 2017). For example, while many migrants to the city may interact with 
the urban economy through platforms, at the same time their exclusion from urban 
citizenship (and all that entails, including access to services) (Zhang and Wang 2010) may 
remain unaffected by their ability to use and access platforms. At the same time as existing 
fissures in urban citizenship status may be untouched (for now), digital platforms have the 
potential of redefining citizenship for existing citizens. For example, the proliferation of 
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governance platforms such as social credit systems (SCS) and their associated reward and 
disincentive mechanisms, signify an increasingly direct individualization of what is socially 
acceptable or not, in a range of areas of urban life, from consumption behaviours, to lifestyle 
patterns, to political expression.  
 
To illustrate the potential reshaping of Chinese urban citizenship through urban platforms, it 
is worthwhile to consider China’s national SCS. A state-led social credit programme was 
initiated in 2014 with the initial aim of enabling government to tackle corruption and other 
challenges. Although other countries use credit scoring systems (notably with regards to 
financial credit scores), China’s SCS landscape has evolved and now represents, globally, the 
most comprehensive attempt to capture digital sources of data about citizens and to reconcile 
them within a single social credit ‘score’. Trials are being conducted in 12 secondary-tier cities 
(Weihai, Rongcheng, Weifang, Suqian, Suzhou, Hangzhou, Yiwu, Wenzhou, Xiamen, Nanjing 
and Suzhou and Chengdu), and are similar, in terms of the government’s lead role, to 
experiments with urban projects (such as smart cities and low-carbon cities) carried out since 
2000. At the same time, corporate-led SCS are also active countrywide, such as Sesame Credit, 
developed by Alibaba and its subsidiary Ant Financial Services Group. 
 
The Chinese SCS programme focuses on key elements as part of its development strategy: a.) 
data integration, namely the aim of reconciling data from a multiplicity of sources (from social 
media activity and networks, to consumer behaviour, to legal convictions, to financial 
creditworthiness) into a scoring system; b.) incentive creation, for example through lower 
mortgage rates for high-scoring individuals, or through blacklisting individuals. For example. 
Sesame Credit scores credit history, behavioural trends, ability to honour financial 
agreements (for example, bills), personal information and social relationships. Incentives 
available to Sesame Credit high-scoring individuals include expedited Singaporean and 
Schengen visa application procedures, reduction or waivers of deposits for a range of services, 
and access to fast lanes at airports. By 2017, over 380 cities had recognised Sesame Credit’s 
scoring system (Creemers 2018) and had put in place incentives to lower deposits (for high 
scorers) in sectors including healthcare, social housing and other public services. Thus, social 
credit systems extend the notion of ‘citizen as sensor’ in the digital city, and towards a view 
of urban citizenship as ordered, rational, and as a response to direct stimuli from specific 
levels of government as well as from corporate actors. It is clear that the areas of focus of 
social credit systems being trialled across China have the potential of redefining citizenship 
so as to shape the citizen into an actor who performs what is expected of them by government 
through a specific form of ‘smartmentality’ (Vanolo 2014). The urban platform is the interface 
through which this form of governmentality is operationalised. In a broader sense, it is useful 
to place the citizenship effects of platform urbanism in a wider context that takes into account 
both risks and benefits to the development of digital urban platforms. The risks, for example, 
include ideological manipulation as well as the increasing corporatization of city government 
and ‘a tendency to normalize a surveillance state’ (Appio et al 2019: 11). 
 
New materialities of platform urbanism 
Our final brief observation focuses on the materialities associated with the rise of platform 
urbanism in China. As seen above, there are emerging geographies of platform urbanism in 
the country, including platforms associated with smart city projects across China’s 
megalopolises and second-tier cities alike. The SCS example above also points to the broad 
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adoption and spread of specific urban platforms in multiple urban centres. Furthermore, as 
seen above, the corporate geographies of technology corporates also exhibit spatial patterns 
with regards to location, territorial zones of business influence, and partnerships with city 
administrations.  
 
Thus, while platform urbanism can be seen as spatially fluid on the one hand (since the 
technologies underlying it can be applied across space, including non-urban spaces), the 
process of emergence of platform urbanism is deeply intertwined with the specific 
geographical contexts of local urban and economic development. This leads to a material, 
geographical patterning in contemporary Chinese platform urbanism. In turn, this reflects 
current uneven smart and other urban development patterns. As Li (2018, 14) et al note:  
 
‘China’s high-level smart cities are mainly distributed in the Beijing, Yangtze River city belt and 
Southern China urban agglomeration, while the central and western economic zones are 
generally backward in smart city construction, posing an obvious gap with the eastern cities.’ 
 
Specifically, China’s eastern cities display more integration of smart urban platforms in 
various areas of urban life, such as consumption and governance. In particular, cities near the 
eastern seaboard (and especially in Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces), and on the southern 
seaboard (especially around Guangzhou) display the highest levels of activity and 
development. This broadly corresponds with the areas of corporate activity centred on two 
major technology corporations, Alibaba (headquartered in Hangzhou) and Tencent (based in 
Shenzhen, near Guangzhou). This may reflect the fact that initial urban smart and platform 
partnerships were developed between technology corporations and city governments local 
to their main bases of operations. It may also be a reflection of the fact that second-tier cities 
like Hangzhou were among the very first to experiment with the roll-out of urban platforms. 
It is important to note, however, that these geographical features are changing and dynamic, 
and that there is no predetermined pattern of activity with regards to platform urbanism. For 
example, Alibaba owns Gaode Map, which is central to geolocation technologies used by 
platforms; Gaode Map, in turn, is based in Beijing, while Alibaba’s headquarters are in 
Hangzhou. 
 
The emergence of a dynamic, patterned and uneven geography of urban platforms in China 
also involves the construction of specific materialities around these data-centred 
developments. Specifically, these materialities can be thought of as materialities around the 
digital infrastructures that enable platform urbanism. These include networks of sensors, 
cables, communications hardware and software, and data processing and storage. For 
example, Hangzhou Citybrain is based on an infrastructure of cameras, sensors, and digital 
networks that represent an assemblage of data, materials, knowledge, regulations, real-time 
behaviour and associated practices. 
 
Platform infrastructure development is at times part and parcel of local development 
priorities. For example, Guizhou province has attempted to attract Big Data, smart and other 
high-tech industries (Liu et al 2014), and infrastructure around data storage is key to its 
blueprint for development as a centre for smart city-related industrial activity. A case in point 
is the construction of data centres in the province. These include Tencent’s Seven Stars Data 
Centre in Gui’an: the facility is located in a network of underground caves and excavations 
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totalling 30,000m2. It is split into two floors, features five 15-metre high entrances, and will 
house tens of thousands of Tencent servers. Guizhou’s climate is a key factor, since a major 
energy draw for data centres relates to cooling: the facility will be able to use cold air for a 
large part of its cooling requirements. Another data centre, being built by Huawei in karst hills 
in Guizhou, will reportedly store up to 600,000 servers (Moss 2018). This points to a physical, 
infrastructural materiality and contingency around platform urbanism. 
 
Platform urbanism also involves the generation of myriad localised materialities around 
production, consumption and lifestyle practices (Kwak et al 2019). These materialities exist 
on a spectrum from the purely technical (materialities around smartphone apps and 
materials) to the techno-social (such as participation in the platform economy of rural-urban 
migrants through platforms such as Meituan and Didi). In turn, it is key to note that some of 
the materialities produced through platform urbanism are not necessarily purely digital: for 
example, ride-hailing or meal delivery services involve networks of vehicles, fuel, logistics, 
food, advertising, and regulatory practices and negotiation. Thus, data-centred urban 
development has material consequences far exceeding the digital world and its networked 
infrastructures. 
 
Finally, a key materiality that we have not considered here is that centred on the financial 
networks, and on mechanisms of financialisation, that enable the development of Chinese 
urban platforms. While a review of these financial networks lies beyond the scope of this 
paper, urban technological development capital is key to the production of China’s urban 
future (Theurillat 2017). Mechanisms of land-based finance are central to local urban 
development in China (Lin and Yi 2011, Wu et al 2006), and to this we would add the need to 
explore and research networks of technology-focused capital and finance that involve both 
public and corporate sources of investment and funding. Additionally, specific platforms are 
starting to shape the financing of urban development, as seen through the development of 
urban investment platforms enabled by blockchain. Examples of this are the development of 
a blockchain-based platform to store real estate data in the city of Loudi, in Hunan province; 
or the Bank of Communications’ September 2018 decision to issue US $1.3bn of mortgages 
through the use of blockchain (Berman 2018).  
 
Conclusion 
The emergence of urban platforms in China represents a rapidly developing extension of 
smart and digitally-enhanced urbanism in the country. Platforms have wide-ranging material 
impacts, and exist both nationally and in specific geographies and territorial configurations 
related to complex geometries of state and corporate power relations. We have highlighted 
how some of the potential effects of platform urbanism are highly significant in a social sense, 
including the potential for a recasting of urban citizenship. Thus, while urban platforms may 
represent a new era with regards to data-mediated urban life, they also represent a universe 
of new (societal, technological, ethical) risks and potential blind spots. Data is central to this 
transition, making it possible to talk not just of Chinese urban futures, but of urban data 
futures. Platforms are central to this evolution: as seen above, they mediate flows of data, 
capital, knowledge, political and regulatory practices and materialities in the production of 
new ways of governing, living in, and consuming the Chinese city. A key task for scholars of 
urban China, and of digital urbanism, is to engage with these fast-moving developments so as 
to provide critical and practice input and reflection at this key juncture. 
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